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climate policies for Brazil and Mexico, we demonstrate that commitments byMexico and Brazil for 2020—made
during the UN climate meetings in Copenhagen and Cancun—are reachable, but they come at different costs for
each country.We ﬁnd that Brazil's commitments will bemet through reduced deforestation, and at no additional
cost; however, Mexico's pledges will cost 4 billion US dollars in terms of reduced GDP in 2020.We explore short-
and long-term implications of several policy scenarios after 2020, considering current policy debates in both
countries. The comparative analysis of these two economies underscores the need for climate policy designed
for the speciﬁc characteristics of each country, accounting for variables such as natural resources and current eco-
nomic structure. Our results also suggest that both Brazil andMexicomay face other environmental and econom-
ic impacts from stringent global climate policies, affecting variables such as the value of energy resources in
international trade.
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In the context of climate changemitigation policy, larger developing
countries will play an important role in future long-term international
agreements. Brazil and Mexico are both upper-middle income coun-
tries, with higher income per capita—$11,690 and $9940 US dollars,
respectively—than the average in Latin America ($9314 US dollars)
(WB, 2014). There are 200.4 million people in Brazil, and 120.8 million
people inMexico (UN, 2013); together, they account for 55% of the Latin
American population. In 2012, with GDPs of $2.25 trillion (Brazil) and
$1.18 trillion (Mexico), together they represented 62% of the Latin
American economy (WB, 2014). As the biggest economies in Latin
America, Brazil andMexico play a central role in climate changemitiga-
tion, and have been under signiﬁcant international pressure to enhance
mitigation action. Both have actively participated in international miti-
gation efforts under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UN, 2009, 2010), as well as in other policy forums such as the G8+5
Climate Change Dialogue. While Brazil and Mexico's emissions are not
among the largest in the world, their contributions to GHG emissionand Policy of Global Change, 77
617 253 7492.
v@mit.edu (S. Paltsev),
. This is an open access article undermitigation are extremely important for several reasons. To reach reduc-
tions substantial enough to eliminate the worst potential consequences
of future climate change, all countries must participate in mitigation ef-
forts (IPCC, 2014); Brazil and Mexico are key leaders among middle-
income countries, and can help to engage the developing world in cli-
mate negotiation processes.
In 2005, Brazil and Mexico emitted 2032 and 667 million tonnes
(Mt) of CO2e respectively (MME and EPE, 2013; SEMARNAT, 2013).1
By 2010, Brazil had reduced emissions by 39%, to 1246 million tonnes
CO2e (6.8 tonnes per capita)with 2.2 tonnes CO2 per capita from energy
alone. A recent deforestation control policy contributed to this
change—land-use emissions dropped sharply, resulting in a net
emission reduction despite the continued upward trend of industrial
and agricultural emissions. In the same period, Mexico's emissions in-
creased by 12%, to 748 million tonnes CO2e (6.1 tonnes per capita)
with 3.8 tonnes CO2 per capita emissions just from energy.
Brazil and Mexico are both signatories of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto
Protocol, and as activemembers of the ongoingUNclimate negotiations,
they have both implemented national strategies for climate change1 These ﬁgures include emissions from fossil fuel use, other industrial emissions and
land use change.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1
EPPA model details.
Country or region Sectors Factors
Africa (AFR) Intermediate & ﬁnal demand: Capital
Australia & New Zealand
(ANZ)
Agriculture (crops, livestock &
forestry)
Labor
Brazil (BRA) Food Crude oil
Canada (CAN) Services Shale oil
China (CHN) Energy-intensive Conventional natural
gas
Rest of Eurasia (ROE) Other industries Unconventional
natural gas
Europe (EUR) Transportation (industrial and
household)
Coal
Higher income East Asia
(ASI)
Other household Demand Hydro
India (IND) Energy supply & electricity
generation:
Nuclear
Japan (JPN) Conventional fossil Wind
Mexico (MEX) Hydro Solar
Middle East (MES) Existing nuclear Land
Rest of Asia (REA) Wind Nuclear
Rest of Latin America
(LAM)
Solar
Russia (RUS) Advanced gas
United States (USA) Advanced gas with CCS
Advanced coal with CCS
Advanced nuclear
Biomass
Fuels
Coal crude oil, reﬁned oil
Natural gas
Liquids from biomass
601C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–614mitigation. Key strategies implemented by Brazil include deforestation
control programs and policies targeting the development of renewable
energy. Mexico has also made remarkable progress using strategies in-
cluding the implementation of a carbon tax, programs promoting re-
newable energy and energy efﬁciency, and deforestation control
strategies.2
As UNFCCC members prepare their positions and policies for the
post-Kyoto world, studies that provide insights regarding comparative
mitigation efforts between peer countries are likely to be useful during
climate negotiations. The goal of this paper is to compare options for
GHG reductions in Brazil andMexico, and to explore similarities and dif-
ferences in their potential approaches to climate changemitigation.We
seek to understand if a global “one-size-ﬁts-all” policy (e.g., identical
carbon price or emission reduction percentages) can be justiﬁed, or if
the countries should focus on their own strategies for emission mitiga-
tion. We use the MIT Economic Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA)
model (Paltsev et al., 2005), a global energy-economic computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) model developed at the MIT Joint Program on
the Science and Policy of Global Change. The scenarios were developed
by the Latin America Modeling Project and the Integrated Climate
Modeling and Capacity Building Project in Latin America (LAMP/
CLIMACAP) described in detail in van der Zwaan et al. (2016a) in this
Special Issue. In this paper we mostly focus on the results from the
EPPA model and provide some comparisons with the other model par-
ticipated in the LAMP/CLIMACAP project.
We focus on the dynamics of emission trends, analyze resulting en-
ergy choices and explain themacroeconomic costs in climate policy sce-
narios. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the EPPA
model. Section 3 provides an overview of the reference scenario, detail-
ing the emissions, energy and electricity mix in the business-as-usual
case, and describing some of the key differences in energy structures af-
fecting policy costs. Section 4 presents the results of several climate pol-
icy scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
2. The MIT EPPA model
The EPPA model is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive dynamic
representation of the global economy (Paltsev et al., 2005). The GTAP
data set provides the base information on the input–output structure
for regional economies, including bilateral trade ﬂows (Dimaranan and
McDougall, 2002; Hertel, 1997). We aggregate the data into 16 regions
and21 sectors. The base year for themodel is 2005, based on the calibra-
tion of the GTAP data for 2004, and from2005 themodel solves at 5-year
intervals. We also further calibrate the data for 2010 as described later.
Table 1 presents the countries (or regions) represented in themodel,
broadly identifying Intermediate and Final Demand sectors and Energy
Supply and Conversion sectors. Energy Supply and Conversion sectors
are modeled in sufﬁcient detail to identify fuels and technologies with
different GHG emissions and to represent both fossil and non-fossil ad-
vanced technologies. There are 16 geographical regions represented ex-
plicitly in the model, including 8 major countries (Brazil, Mexico, USA,
Japan, Canada, China, India and Russia) and 8 regional aggregations of
other countries. For the CLIMACAP/LAMPmodeling exercise, all regions
were modeled as speciﬁed in EPPA, but in this paper we only report re-
sults for Brazil and Mexico.
The production structure for electricity is themost detailed of all sec-
tors, and captures technological changes that will be important to track
under climate policy (Fig. 1). The top-level nests allow different treat-
ments for traditional and advanced generation technologies (conven-
tional fossil, nuclear, and hydro, natural gas and coal CCS, IGCC,
advanced combined cycle technologies, bioelectricity, wind and solar).2 A detailed discussion of both regulatory and policy progress in these countries can be
found in Government of Brazil (2008); SEMARNAT (2014); Lucena et al. (2014); Veysey
et al. (2014); Nachmany et al. (2014); Margulis and Dubeux. (2011); da Motta et al.
(2011); Galindo (2009).Most of the advanced technologies enter as perfect substitutes for
existing technologies (i.e., the elasticity of substitution is inﬁnite), ex-
cept for renewable energy technologies, which have a special treatment
in the model. We represent two types of penetration for wind and solar
technologies. At low levels of penetration, generic wind and solar tech-
nologies aremodeled as producing an imperfect substitute of electricity,
reﬂecting diurnal and seasonal variability and intermittency. At large-
scale penetration, we allow wind and solar to enter as perfect substi-
tutes, but require a back-up generating unit either from natural gas or
biomass. We introduce these as “hybrid” technologies, as wind and
solar technologies will require additional capacity to overcome inter-
mittency issues before they can be competitive under climate policy.
Biomass use—where a liquid fuel is produced and assumed to be a per-
fect substitute for reﬁned oil—is included both in electricity generation
and transport.
The deployment of advanced technologies is endogenous to the
model. Advanced technologies, such as cellulosic biofuel or wind and
solar technologies, enter the market when they become cost competi-
tive with existing technologies. Technologies are ranked according to
their levelized cost of electricity (EIA, 2014), plus additional integration
costs for wind and solar (Morris et al., 2010). When a carbon price ex-
ists, low carbon technologies are introduced as explained by
McFarland et al. (2004). Initially, a ﬁxed factor is required to represent
costs of deployment (e.g. institutional costs, learning costs) for new
technologies that—while competitive—require some time to penetrate
into themarket. The ﬁxed-factor supply grows each period as a function
of deployment until it becomes non-binding, allowing for large-scale
deployment of the new technology. A complete description of the
nesting structure of electricity generation in the EPPA model can be
found in Paltsev et al. (2005); Morris et al. (2010) and McFarland et al.
(2004). Fig. 1 depicts the production structure for electricity generation
with the details for wind electricity.3 The synthetic coal gas industry3 A similar structure exists for other advanced technologies such as solar, gas CCS, coal
CCS and advanced nuclear; however, each technology differs in its input (i.e. CCSwill have
speciﬁed shares for the costs of capturing CO2).
4 Global warming potential (GWP) measures the radiative forcing of atmospheric con-
centrations of different gases, allowing for an aggregation of emissions of gaseswith differ-
ent lifetimes and heat-trapping characteristics into a single metric (CO2e).
Fig. 1. Nesting structure of electricity generation.The ﬁgure depicts only windgas technology in the lower levels, as an example of hybrid technologies. For the structure of fossil, nuclear,
hydro,wind and solar see (Paltsev et al., 2005), for the structure of AdvancedNuclear and Fossil technologies see (McFarland et al., 2004), and for the structure ofWindBio see (Morris et al.,
2010).
602 C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–614produces a perfect substitute for natural gas. The oil shale industry pro-
duces a perfect substitute for reﬁned oil.
Note: The ﬁgure depicts onlywindgas technology in the lower levels,
as an example of hybrid technologies. For the structure of fossil, nuclear,
hydro, wind and solar see Paltsev et al. (2005), for the structure of Ad-
vanced Nuclear and Fossil technologies see McFarland et al. (2004),
and for the structure of WindBio see Morris et al. (2010).
Regarding land use,we explicitlymodel land conversion for different
economic uses. Each land type is a resource that, after each year of pro-
duction, may be converted to another type or abandoned to a non-use
category. A land transformation production function converts land
from one use to another by combining land with other inputs (Gurgel
et al., 2007). In the general equilibrium framework, consistency across
conversions is necessary for both the physical units and the economic
value. In land type conversion (between cropland, pastureland and
managed forest), we assume that 1 ha of any land type converts to
1 ha of any other type, and that converted land takes on the region's av-
erage productivity level for the new land type. Additionally, we assume
that the marginal conversion cost of land from one type to another is
equal to the difference in value of the types.
The model includes representation of CO2 and non-CO2 (CH4, N2O,
HFCs, PFCs and SF6) greenhouse gas emission abatement, and calculates
reductions fromgas-speciﬁc controlmeasures aswell as those occurring
as a byproduct of actions directed at CO2.More detail on howabatement
costs are represented for these substances is provided in Hyman et al.
(2003).
Future scenarios are driven by economic growth (resulting from sav-
ings and investments) and by exogenously speciﬁed productivity im-
provement in labor, energy, and land. Demand for goods produced
from each sector increases as GDP and income grow; stocks of limited
resources (e.g. coal, oil and natural gas) deplete with use, driving pro-
duction to higher cost grades; sectors that use renewable resources
(e.g. land) compete for the available ﬂow of services from them, gener-
ating rents. Combined with policy and other constraints, these drivers
change the relative economics of different technologies over time and
across scenarios, as advanced technologies only enter the market
when they become cost-competitive.
When emission constraints on certain countries, gases, or sectors are
imposed in a CGE model such as EPPA, the model calculates a shadow
value of the constraint—interpretable as a price that would be obtained
under an allowance market that developed under a cap-and-tradesystem. The solution algorithm of the EPPA model ﬁnds least-cost re-
ductions for each gas in each sector, and if emissions trading is allowed
it equilibrates the prices using Global Warming Potential (GWP)
weights.4 This set of conditions, often referred to as what and where
ﬂexibility, usually leads to least-cost abatement. Without these condi-
tions, abatement costs will vary among sources. This variation would
impact the estimated welfare cost, because abatement would be least-
cost within a sector or region or for a speciﬁc gas, but would not be
equilibrated among them.
For the CLIMACAP/LAMP modeling exercise, we adjusted the EPPA
model in the following ways. Flex-fuel vehicles for Brazil are included,
allowing for substitution between gasoline–ethanol blend and pure eth-
anol. To reﬂect current ﬂeet trends in Brazil, we increase the share of
ﬂex fuel vehicles—in 2013 the share of ﬂex fuel cars estimated by EPE
was 57% (EPE, 2013), so in our model we start with ﬂex fuel cars at
30% in 2005, increase to 95% by 2065, and stay constant thereafter.
We also included bioelectricity production from sugarcane bagasse,
which was calibrated for a total generation of 0.07 EJ in 2010. We pa-
rameterized the model so that this type of energy represents around
3–4% of the power mix in our reference scenario in 2010. We updated
population trends based on UN data (UN, 2013), as well as GDP growth
and electricity sector fuel use through 2010 (IEA, 2013; WB, 2014). In
2005, EPPA estimates a total of 2208 million tonnes CO2e in Brazil, but
the National Emissions Inventory of Brazil reported 2032. Given
Brazil's high reduction of emissions from deforestation policy, we ad-
justed EPPA trends to match the 2010 inventory data; with this adjust-
ment, for 2010 EPPA estimates Brazil's 2010 CO2e emissions at
1210 million tonnes. For Mexico, 2005 EPPA's estimate of 710 million
tonnes CO2e emissions is higher than the 667million tonnes of CO2e re-
ported in Mexico's national inventory. These deviations are a result of
energy-sector emissions in EPPA being higher than observed values.
Scenarios modeled for the CLIMACAP/LAMP exercise are presented
in Table 2 and detailed in the following sections. In the Scenario 1a
(Core Baseline) we include climate and energy policies enacted prior
to 2010, including deforestation control policies in Brazil, the EU ETS
and biofuel requirements in the US and EU, as well as the current
Table 2
LAMP/CLIMACAP scenario description.
Scenario Policy name Policy description
1a Core baseline Business-as-usual scenario including climate and energy policies enacted prior to 2010.
1b Policy baseline Business-as-usual scenario including “Copenhagen pledges” enacted since 2010.
2a $10 CO2 price A carbon tax is levied of 10 $/tCO2e in 2020, growing at 4%/year to reach 32$/tCO2e in 2050.
2c $50 CO2 price A carbon tax is levied of 50 $/tCO2e in 2020, growing at 4%/year to reach 162$/tCO2e in 2050.
2d 20% abatement (GHG) GHG emissions, excluding LUC CO2, are reduced by 5% in 2020, linearly increasing to 20% in 2050, w.r.t. 2010.
2e 50% abatement (GHG) GHG emissions, excluding LUC CO2, are reduced by 12.5% in 2020, linearly increasing to 50% in 2050, with respect to 2010.
2f 20% abatement (FF&I) Fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions are reduced by 5% in 2020, linearly increasing to 20% in 2050, with respect to 2010.
2g 50% abatement (FF&I) Fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions are reduced by 12.5% in 2020, linearly increasing to 50% in 2050, with respect to 2010.
a) Brazil b) Mexico
Fig. 2. Emissions inventory in 2010.
603C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–614policies to incentivize the use of biofuels in Brazil. In the Scenario 1b
(Policy Baseline) we also include the Copenhagen pledges enacted
after 2010. For our modeling exercise we considered Brazil and
Mexico pledges explicitly—a 36.1%–38.9% reduction for Brazil and a
30% reduction for Mexico by 2020. For Brazil, we account for emission
reductions from the existing deforestation policy, and base our projec-
tions of energy use in 2020 on its National Energy Plan (EPE, 2013);
for Mexico, we allow the model to reach least-cost reductions; for the
Rest of Latin America, we consider a 13% reduction (in all GHGs) for
2020; and for the Rest of the World, we allow an increase of 12% for
CO2 and 9% for other GHGs.5 In addition to the Scenario 1a (Core Base-
line) and Scenario (Policy Baseline), we model a combination of carbon
taxes and emissions constraints. For Scenarios 2a–2g, the same policy
is imposed on all regions of the world, including Brazil and Mexico.
For the CLIMACAP/LAMP exercise, emission trading across sectors with-
in a region is always allowed, but trade across regions is partially limit-
ed: trade between Latin American countries and trade between non-
Latin American countries is allowed, but Latin American countries do
not trade with non-Latin American countries. This was done to ensure
comparability across regional and global models that participate in the
exercise.
3. Overview of the core baseline scenario
This section presents an overview of the EPPA model estimates for
the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline),6 where we only include climate and5 For modeling purposes, we follow the CLIMACAP/LAMP Scenario protocol where the
pledges were summarized in aggregate emission reductions for different regions in Sce-
nario 1b (Policy baseline). The detailed Copenhagen pledges (UN, 2009) for each country
can be found at http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php.
6 A comparison of base year data and baseline trajectories are presented in this Special
Issue, where the EPPAmodel outputs are benchmarked against IEA, UN and other data for
the base year and for the projections from other models (van Ruijven et al., 2015).energy policies enacted prior to 2010. As we discuss later, the climate
policy costs and emissions abatement potentials for Brazil and Mexico
are related to each country's current energy mix and natural resources.
Vast hydropower resources and large, productive land areas lead Brazil to
rely on hydropower and to develop their bio-energy sector; in addition,
high energy prices during the oil shock in the 1970's triggered diversiﬁca-
tion of the energy mix to reduce foreign oil dependence. As a result, just
62% of Brazil's primary energy comes from fossil fuel sources. In contrast,
Mexico—endowedwith substantial oil resources—developed a signiﬁcant
petroleum industry and positioned itself as a prominent oil exporting
country. While Mexico's renewable energy resources are abundant, the
low cost of oil has led to a preference for fossil energy, and 98% of
Mexico's primary energy is from fossil fuel.
These starting positions result in two very different initial break-
downs of GHG emissions. Fig. 2 shows the reference emissions by sector
for both countries. As shown, the share of energy related emissions is
much higher in Mexico than in Brazil (67% vs. 32%), but land-use emis-
sions are lower in Mexico than in Brazil (6% vs. 22%). Industrial sectors
contribute with similar shares of emissions in both countries (8% and
7%, respectively).
In our Scenario 1a (Core Baseline), without policies to price carbon,
electricity mixes reﬂect the economics of different technologies and
their capacity to provide baseload, intermediate and peak power during
the year, as well as local resources availability and proximity to energy
markets. Our Scenario 1a (Core Baseline) results for primary energy
are shown in Fig. 3. EPPA estimates a total primary energy supply of
10.1 EJ in Brazil and 6.7 EJ in Mexico for 2010 (IEA data in 2010 for
Brazil is 10.3 EJ and 7.4 EJ for Mexico (IEA, 2014a,e)).77 The difference stems from an underestimation of biomass and geothermal energy,
which are not disaggregated in the GTAP database.
a) Brazil b) Mexico
Fig. 3. Primary energy (Scenario 1a (Core Baseline)).
604 C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–614In Brazil's 2010 primary energy mix, EPPA estimates a substantial
contribution from hydro energy—1.6 EJ, or about 13%—and additional
contributions from natural gas, coal and nuclear in shares of 9%, 5%
and 1%, respectively. Our modeling results for 2010 agree with the IEA
data (IEA, 2014a).8 EPPA also estimates that Brazil relies heavily on oil
and biomass for energy uses, with oil at 5 EJ and biomass at 2.5 EJ,9 or
40% and 31% of total primary energy, respectively.
Since development of hydropower is limited by total resource
availability, other energy sources start growing at a faster pace in
the future projections of energy use. We calibrate EPPA to consider
maximum total hydro resource potential for all basins in Brazil
based on the National Energy Plan 2030 resource assessment (EPE,
2007). In the Amazon and Tocantins/Araguaia regions, we only
consider hydro resource that could be developed without signiﬁcant
environmental impacts. Our results show that by 2050 Brazil will
signiﬁcantly increase use of natural gas, oil and biomass, with the
renewable hydro and biomass covering 31% of energy needs.
CLIMACAP/LAMP models project varying primary energy mixes—some
models show higher use of coal (MESSAGE model) or biomass (POLES
model) (van Ruijven et al., 2015).
InMexico, fossil fuels supplied over 97% of energy in 2010, dominat-
ing the primary energy mix. EPPA estimates oil use at 3.6 EJ, natural gas
at 2.6 EJ and coal at 0.3 EJ. Hydro and nuclear account for 0.13 EJ and
0.6 EJ, or 2% and 1%, respectively. Again, the EPPA model numbers for
2010 are very close to the IEA statistics (IEA, 2014e). Considering that
most of Mexico's economic hydropower potential has already been
tapped in the baseline year, we project that Mexico will continue to
rely almost entirely on fossil resources for its energy needs, with some
increase in natural gas and oil use. In the absence of policy interventions,
no other energy sources are expected to increase signiﬁcantly. For
Mexico, all CLIMACAP/LAMPmodels agree that fossil energy will domi-
nate the mix in the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline) and only one model
(POLES) projects solar resource deployment by 2050 (van Ruijven
et al., 2015).
3.1. Electricity
Brazil starts with a cleaner electricity mix than Mexico. EPPA esti-
mates that hydro energy supplies 79% of Brazil's electricity in 2010,
followed by natural gas (9%), biofuels (5%), nuclear (3%), oil (2%) and
wind and coal (1% each).10 In contrast, fossil fuels comprise themajority8 EPPA estimates 0.9 EJ (1 EJ real data) of natural gas, 0.5 EJ (0.6 EJ real data) and 0.1 EJ
(0.2 EJ real data) of nuclear. In relative terms, the participation of the resources is the same
in the EPPA model than in real data.
9 It isworth noting that the IEA reporting for biomass includeswaste use for energy pur-
poses, while EPPA includes only biofuels.
10 IEA data for 2010 for Brazil shows 78% hydro, 7% natural gas, 6% biofuels, 3% oil, 2%
coal, and 0.4% wind (IEA, 2014b).of Mexico's 2010 electricity mix, with natural gas (55%), coal (10%) and
oil (9%), accounting for 74% of the mix. Other sources of electricity in-
clude hydropower (17%), nuclear (8%) and biomass (1%).11
Fig. 4 shows our projections for both countries' electricity mix up to
2050. Brazil continues to rely on hydropower, developing the potential
of the North and Amazon basins; natural gas also increases, becoming a
lower-cost resource due to reserves and discoveries of the pre-salt oil
and gas ﬁelds. Mexico makes a rapid transition to natural gas technolo-
gies, driven by lower-cost natural gas in North American markets and
domestic policies allowing expansion of infrastructure for the extraction
and distribution of natural gas.
3.2. Final energy use: industry, transportation and residential and
commercial
In 2010, EPPA estimates ﬁnal energy use of 8.9 EJ for Brazil, and 4.9 EJ
for Mexico. In 2050, ﬁnal energy use grows in all sectors of both econo-
mies, as shown in Fig. 5, with industry and transportation consuming a
majority of all ﬁnal energy—77% in Brazil and 53% in Mexico. This result
is based on the relative shares of the sectors in the base year, their ener-
gy intensity, fuel and ﬂeet mix, and improvements in energy efﬁciency.
Energy efﬁciency improvements are driven by twomajor factors: price-
and income-induced efﬁciency improvements and non-price induced
technological changes, both are parameterized to historic responses as
described in Paltsev et al. (2005), Webster et al. (2008) and Chen et al.
(2015).
3.3. Emission trends
The resulting emission trends for Brazil and Mexico are shown in
Fig. 6. We show results for the trends projected by EPPA for 2050. It
should be noted that deforestation control programs were put in place
that caused Brazil's land-use emissions to decrease by 80% between
2005 and 2010. We impose a policy constraint on land-use emissions
to reﬂect these regulations. Both countries' emission trajectories
ended at almost the same level for CO2; however, compared to
Mexico, Brazil emits 3.5 times the amount of methane and twice the
amount of nitrous oxide. The difference in non-CO2 emissions can be ex-
plained by the greater amount of agriculture and cattle-raising econom-
ic activities in Brazil.
Fig. 7 shows the contribution of CO2 emissions from combustion pro-
cesses and land-use change (to 2050)—an important distinction formit-
igation strategies. We assume that Brazil's successful deforestation
control programs continue throughout the modeling period. Although11 IEA data for Mexico for 2010 shows 52% gas, 16% oil, 12% coal, 14% hydro, 2% nuclear,
2% geothermal and 1% biomass (IEA, 2014f).
Fig. 6. Emissions trends for CO2 (fossil and land use), methane, nitrous dioxide and F-gases (Scenario 1a (Core Baseline)).
a) Brazil b) Mexico
Fig. 5. Final energy use by sector Scenario 1a (Core Baseline)).
a) Brazil b) Mexico
Fig. 4. Electricity mix (Scenario 1a (Core Baseline)).
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a) Fossil and Industry b) Land Use
Fig. 7. CO2 emissions Scenario 1a (Core Baseline)).
a) Brazil    b) Mexico
Fig. 8. Emissions of CO2e for all scenarios.
606 C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–614signiﬁcant levels of deforestation control enforcement are still needed
to avoid the high levels of deforestation previously experienced in
Brazil,12 as 60% of its total area is still under natural vegetation we be-
lieve a low and constant level of deforestation is a reasonable conserva-
tive assumption.4. Policy scenarios
Following the CLIMACAP/LAMP scenario protocol, we modeled
seven policies: 1) Scenario 1b (Policy baseline): the Copenhagen climate
mitigation pledges; 2) Scenario 2a ($10 CO2 price): a carbon tax of $10/
tCO2e, starting in 2020 and increasing by 4% each year; 3) Scenario 2c
($50 CO2 price): a carbon tax of $50/tCO2e, starting in 2020 and increas-
ing by 4% each year; 4) Scenario 2d (20% abatement (GHG)): a total
emissions cap, reducing CO2e from 2010 levels 5% by 2020, 10% by
2030, 15% by 2040 and 20% from 2050 onwards; 5) Scenario 2e (50%
abatement (GHG)): a stringent total emissions cap, reducing CO2e from
2010 levels 12.5% by 2020, 25% by 2030, 37.5% by 2040, and 50% from
2050 onwards; 6) Scenario 2f (20% abatement (FF&I)): a cap on CO2
emissions only, following the same reductions of Scenario 2d; and
7) Scenario 2 g (50% abatement (FF&I)): a cap on CO2 emissions only, fol-
lowing the same reductions of Scenario 2e (See Table 2).13
We consider the Copenhagen pledges—voluntary commitments to
reduce emissions by 2020—fromboth Brazil andMexico. Brazil commit-
ted to reductions of 36–39% from its business-as-usual (BAU) projection
of 3236 Mt CO2e (MCTI, 2013), aiming for 1977–2068 Mt CO2e (a12 Policies to reduce deforestation even further are not designed in Brazil yet and despite
some discussion about “zero deforestation” in the country, there is no agreement about
such target or its political feasibility.
13 Scenarios 2f and 2g were speciﬁed to provide a comparison with energy system only
models.reduction of 1168–1259 Mt CO2e) by 2020 (MCTI, 2013).14 By 2010,
Brazil's emissions were already down to 1246 Mt CO2e—well below
the target (MCTI, 2013). If land-use emissions are kept under control,
then even with very rapid growth in fossil and industrial emissions,
Brazil will be well below the ofﬁcial Copenhagen target for its total
emissions. Our estimate for Brazil's new business-as-usual (including
reductions from 2005 to 2010) is around 1400 Mt CO2e in 2020—still
well below the Copenhagen target. We still require the industry to re-
duce its emissions according to Brazil's sectoral speciﬁcations in the Co-
penhagen pledges—a small requirement relative to Brazil's total
emissions. Brazil has no further announcements of policy targets be-
yond 2020; therefore, after 2020 we allow Brazil emissions to grow ac-
cording to the Scenario 1b (Policy baseline).
Mexico has pledged to reduce CO2e emissions from its business-as-
usual scenario projection of 882 Mt CO2e (SEMARNAT, 2012) to about
620 Mt CO2e—about 30%. In the EPPA model, Mexico's 2005 emissions
correspond to the ofﬁcial data of about 700 Mt CO2e. However, unlike
the ofﬁcial business-as-usual estimates, we project a switch from coal
and fuel oil to natural gas generation—an assumption supported by ac-
tual changes in Mexico's energy sector, driven by imports of relatively
cheap natural gas from the USA (IEA, 2013; Paltsev et al., 2011). As a re-
sult, our business-as-usual projections place Mexico's 2020 emissions
lower than the ofﬁcial projections—at about the same level as 2005
emissions. Therefore, in our projections Mexico starts out closer to its
Copenhagen target than in the ofﬁcial estimate.
Fig. 8 shows total emission trajectories in CO2e for each scenario,
and Fig. 9 shows the associated policy cost (measured as GDP loss in
2005 US dollars15). To facilitate policy comparison, in Fig. 10 we show
total cumulative emissions and cost for each scenario. From the total14 The ofﬁcial business-as-usual projections donot consider emission reductions that oc-
curred between 2005 and 2010.
15 We report all monetary results in 2005 US dollars, unless speciﬁed otherwise.
a) Policy costs b) Emissions
Fig. 10. Cumulative policy costs and emissions for all scenarios (2010–2050).
a) Brazil    b) Mexico
Fig. 9. Policy cost for all scenarios.
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require very different mitigation efforts. In our Scenario 1a (Core Base-
line), Brazil will require almost no additional mitigation, as the emis-
sions reduction from deforestation control has already occurred.16 For
Mexico, ourmodeling results suggest that current policies implemented
are aligned to reach the Copenhagen pledges by 2020, and the policy
cost could be in the order of 4 billion US dollars in that year.
Our analysis shows the differences between two distinctive policy
instruments: carbon taxes and emissions quantity constraints. Key con-
siderations for new policies are cost totals and timing, and the total cost
and timing of each policy can change depending on the prices and con-
straints imposed each decade, as explained in Table 2.17
Brazil and Mexico both see similar results in Scenario 2a ($10 CO2
price), which resulted in slower reduction atﬁrst, but ultimately a great-
er emissions reduction in the end. Brazil and Mexico also show similar
results in Scenario 2c ($50 CO2 price) and Scenario 2d (20% abatement
(GHG)). Total cumulative emissions are comparable, as are the total pol-
icy costs (as shown in Fig. 10b). However, a key difference between
Scenarios 2c and 2d is that these costs occur at different points in time
(see Fig. 9a and b). For Brazil, Scenario 2c has a higher total economic
cost than Scenario 2d in 2020, but by 2050 their relative costs are re-
versed. Scenario 2c requires more abatement early on, but once new
technologies are in place as a result of the tax, lower costs are incurred
at the end of the period. Scenario 2d has a lower cost early on, but the16 Brazil reduced deforestation from an average of 2.6 million ha in the period 2000 to
2005 to less than 0.7 million ha after 2010. This policy was incorporated in the Brazilian
Copenhagen pledges in 2009 and conﬁrmed by Law 12.187, The National Plan on Climate
Policy, enacted in December 2009 (WRI, 2010). Policies to reduce deforestation even fur-
ther are not designed in Brazil yet and despite some discussion about “zero deforestation”
in the country, there is no agreement about such target or its political feasibility.
17 In this exercise we have not accounted for cost inter-temporal discounting (consider-
ing different discount rate factors), which is something that policy makers could take into
account.relatively relaxed cap delays technology deployment, increasing later
costs and ultimately requiring additional abatement from all sectors.
We observe these same dynamics in Mexico, although to a much lesser
extent.
All scenarios imply increased GDP losses from 2020 to 2050, ranging
from1–11% forMexico and 0–4% for Brazil (Fig. 10a). For both countries,
policy costs are the highest in Scenario 2e (50% abatement (GHG)) and
Scenario 2 g (50% abatement (FF&I)).
It is worth comparing the carbon prices resulting from emissions
caps. For example, in Scenario 2e (50% abatement (GHG)), carbon prices
for 2020, 2030 and 2050 in Brazil are $9/tCO2e, $74/tCO2e, and $386/
tCO2e, respectively. The corresponding prices in Mexico are $17/tCO2e,
$101/tCO2e, and $437/tCO2e. In Scenario 2c ($50 CO2 price), both coun-
tries have a tax that is equivalent to $50/tCO2e in 2020 and reaching
$162/tCO2e in 2050. For the cap Scenarios 2d, 2e, 2f and 2 g, lower car-
bon prices in the initial periods lead to higher prices in the later periods
in comparison to the tax Scenarios 2a and 2c.
Our results suggest that even Scenario 2a ($10/tCO2e tax), the
lowest-cost policy, could have a signiﬁcant impact on total emissions
trajectories. Compared to the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline), Scenario 2a
($10/tCO2e tax) reduces total cumulative emissions by 25% in Brazil
and 28% in Mexico. In contrast, Scenario 2e (CO2e cap, 50% by 2050) re-
duces total cumulative emissions the most—by 50% in Brazil and 60% in
Mexico—but also costs 10 and 7 times more for Brazil and Mexico, re-
spectively. The cumulative costs of Scenario 2c ($50/tCO2e tax) are
about 4 times higher than Scenario 2a ($10/tCO2e tax).18
In the following sections we describe some of the changes occurring
in each scenario in terms of energy use, technology deployment in rele-
vant sectors and land-use changes.18 Policy costs vary widely amongmodels in the CLIMACAP/LAMP exercise; for a discus-
sion of macroeconomic impacts see Summerton et al. (2015).
a) Brazil    b) Mexico
Fig. 11.Mitigation in the electricity sector.
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Brazil and Mexico have several options for emission reductions: to
use existing lower-carbon technology, to deploy new low-carbon tech-
nologies into their production processes and ﬁnal energy use, and in-
creases in energy efﬁciency. In addition to exogenously speciﬁed
energy efﬁciency improvements, EPPA models the price-induced and
income-induced energy efﬁciency improvements that lead to a substan-
tial demand response resulting from policy implementation. Demand
response is parameterized based on historic responses to energy priceFig. 12. Land cover (the Scenincreases (Webster et al., 2008). The resulting energy consumption is af-
fected both by demand and supply responses.
For example, in Scenario 2a ($10/tCO2e tax), ﬁnal energy use in 2050
decreases by 9% in bothMexico and Brazil, compared to the Scenario 1a
(Core Baseline). In Scenario 2c ($50/tCO2e tax), the corresponding num-
bers are 27% for Mexico and 22% for Brazil. Comparing these responses
from the EPPAmodel to the other models in the CLIMACAP/LAMP exer-
cise, one can notice that there are two types of the model responses in
this respect: those that calculate energy efﬁciency improvements and
demand responses, and those with relatively inelastic demand. Forario 1a (Core Baseline)).
Fig. 13. Energy use in the Brazilian industrial sector.
609C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–614example, in Scenario 2c ($50/tCO2e tax), the more responsive IMAGE,
Phoenix, GCAM and LEAP-UNAM models show a 15%–35% reduction
in ﬁnal energy use for Mexico and Brazil, while the relatively inelastic
TIAM-ECN, POLES, and MESSAGE models show a reduction of 4–8% for
Brazil and 5–14% for Mexico (Lucena et al., 2015; Veysey et al., 2015).
Driven by energy efﬁciency improvements and other factorsmentioned
above, energy intensity of GDP also decreases in response to these pol-
icy changes. EPPA results show that by 2050, energy intensity decreases
from baseline in both Scenario 2a ($10/tCO2e tax), 7% in Mexico, and 8%Fig. 14.Mitigation in the Mein Brazil, and Scenario 2c ($50/tCO2e tax), 22% in Mexico and 20% in
Brazil.
4.2. Low-carbon electricity technologies deployment
As shown in Fig. 11, in the Scenario 2d (20% abatement (GHG)) and
Scenario 2e (50% abatement (GHG)), Brazil continues to use its hydropow-
er, adding natural gas, biomass and more wind. Since Brazil has a clean
electricity mix to start with, it is harder to reduce carbon emissionsxican industrial sector.
Fig. 16. Oil net exports (Scenario 1a (Core Baseline) and Scenario 2g (50% abatement (FF&I))).
Fig. 15. Energy use in the transportation sector.
610 C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–614from electricity sector in Brazil, but there is substantial mitigation poten-
tial from agriculture, and existing low-carbon technologies can be
brought into the energy mix. Due to high capital requirements and sunk
costs of old projects, Brazil's hydropower is not as responsive to carbon
pricing as other generation technologies. When economy-wide emission
constraint is imposed in Brazil, we ﬁnd that the most economic option is
tomitigate in the agricultural sector. In contrast, Mexico's most economic
option is to deploy new advanced technologies, such as natural gas and
coal with CCS.
Themodels in the CLIMACAP/LAMP exercise present a large range of
the results regarding technology deployment. However, all models
agree that in a comparison of Scenario 2e (50% abatement (GHG)) to
Scenario 1a (Core Baseline), Brazil's fossil energy use decreases, and
Mexico will deploy natural gas with CCS. Most models agree that
Brazil will substantially expand biomass, wind and solar use, and that
Mexico will deploy substantial biomass generation or expand use of
other renewables (Lucena et al., 2015; Veysey et al., 2015).
While we focus in the 2050 horizon in this paper, in the CLIMACAP/
LAMP scenarios we estimated results up to 2100. We found other tech-
nologies playing a signiﬁcant role later in the period, as population andFig. 17. Brazil's biofuels exports.economic trends increasingly require more energy despite the emis-
sions cap. The electric power sector boosts its zero-carbon technologies
in the second half of the century. Wind and solar technologies increase
penetration in the second half of the century in all scenarios. There are
two sets of reasons for this relatively late penetration compared to
other CLIMACAP/LAMP models (see van der Zwaan et al. (2016a)).
First, our model considers the costs of replacing existing infrastructure
in the different regions (some models do not fully internalize the costs
of vintaged capital), as well as institutional costs that slow the penetra-
tion of new technologies in themodel (as a function of installed capacity
in the previous period). Second, to account for reliability constraints, the
intermittent nature of renewables in our model is taken care of by im-
posing a requirement of full back-up capacity for large-scale penetration
of renewables, either with natural gas turbines or bioelectricity plants.
Thus, inMexicowe ﬁrst see a transition towards natural gas technol-
ogies, which are competitive both because of low natural gas prices in
the region and because they are dispatchable technologies. The model
then progresses to the deployment of wind and solar generation as
those technologies become competitive.19
The deployment of low-carbon electricity technologies is of great in-
terest for policy makers; however, several uncertainties arise regarding
future technology costs. For example, innovation and deployment of re-
newable energy technologies around the world could rapidly decrease
the costs of solar and wind energy. The International Energy Agency es-
timates a learning rate for these technologies in the order of 5% for bio-
mass, geothermal and onshore wind, 18% for solar PV and 10% for CSP
(IEA, 2014c). The US Energy Information Administration studies also
project future cost reductions both in renewables and in CCS technolo-
gies. EPPA's electricity cost assumptions are based on EIA (2014).
Technology costs are reduced over time for all technologies based on19 More detailed studies are needed to better incorporate the operational constraints of
power systemswith large-scale penetration of renewables, and the need for ﬂexibility op-
tions such as storage technologies and transmission and distribution networks that will be
needed to increase the current system ﬂexibility (Octaviano et al., 2015).
Fig. 18. Brazil's net imports.
611C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–614the EIA projections. EIA (2014) reports that the levelized cost of solar
electricity in 2040 is still more than 40% higher than natural gas with
CCS; thus, the EPPA model installs more natural gas than solar in
Mexico. Similar results regarding the economics of current solar tech-
nologies are found by Frank (2014). Wind energy has a competitive
levelized cost of electricity, but once we account for intermittency
costs, wind also penetrates slowly. Given the uncertainties regarding
technology costs and potential deployment under carbon policy, we be-
lieve that there could be value in portfolio diversiﬁcation. EPPA does not
deploy renewables at scale during theﬁrst decades of climate policy im-
plementation (2020–2050), but the large-scale deployment of renew-
ables needed for deep decarbonization (2050–2100) could justify
policies for early technology deployment to prepare the energy transi-
tion, such as those currently under consideration by the Mexican gov-
ernment (SENER, 2013).
Storing CO2 with CCS technologies at scale imposes a technological
challenge (Herzog, 2001) and the storage capacity and rate of deploy-
ment must be taken into consideration, including the development of
adequate regulatory frameworks and incentives to avoid potential leak-
age issues (i.e., high penalties and standards for site construction). The
largest cumulative amount of stored carbon from CCS technology is
about 4Gt CO2 by2050 in Scenario 2e (50% abatement (GHG)). TheMex-
ican government has started the development of a National Strategy for
CO2 Carbon Capture and Storage (SENER, 2014) and themapping of po-
tential sites and storage capacity (SENER/CFE, 2014) with a preliminary
estimate of the total carbon storage theoretical potential of 111 Gt CO2.20 For a comparison to landuse results fromothermodels seeCalvinet al. (2016-in this issue).4.3. Land-use changes
Careful analysis of policy-driven land-use changes is of the utmost
importance in the region. While agriculture contributed with 5% and
3% of total GDP of Brazil and Mexico in 2010, the population working
on this sector is 17% in Brazil and 13% in Mexico (WB, 2014). Much of
the economically vulnerable population, including poor households
and indigenous communities, depend on this activity. Thus, the conse-
quences of policy on farmers and communities in Brazil and Mexico
are of special concern. In addition to providing important ecosystem
services (e.g. carbon sequestration), the forests and other ecosystems
in Brazil and Mexico provide critical biodiversity—both Brazil and
Mexico are among the 17 megadiverse countries of the world
(Groombridge, 1994). In the past, economic growth has driven an ex-
pansion of agriculture and pasture at the expense of forests and other
ecosystems. EPPA provides a high-level analysis of economic incentives
that will drive land conversion under different scenarios. Fig. 12 shows
EPPA model estimates for land uses in Brazil and Mexico as a result of
expected land conversion in the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline).
For our baseline scenario, we consider the policies that Brazil and
Mexico have already implemented to reduce deforestation. For Brazil,
without additional policy efforts, total land-use emissions are set tomaintain 2010 levels, but total cropland still expands from 8 to 22%
due to increasing food demand and biofuels production. This expansion
comes from conversion of other arable land (6%) and forests (8%). Pas-
ture also expands from 17% to 19%, at the expense of forests. Mexico
has implemented policies to slow deforestation rates, but they are still
high. Without further policy efforts, Mexico's cropland expansion will
come at the expense of forests and other arable land. Forest cover in
Mexico is projected to decrease from 38% of the total land area in
2010 to 28% by 2050.20
4.4. Industry and transport
Brazil's industrial use of electricity, liquids, natural gas and coal in-
creases over time in the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline). In all policy scenar-
ios their use is lower than in the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline) (Fig. 13). In
Mexico, industrial use of electricity, natural gas and liquids is growing
over time in the Scenario 1a, while coal use is slightly reduced after
2020 due to natural gas substitution (Fig. 14).
In the policy scenarios, coal, electricity, and natural gas use de-
creases, while liquid use increases. The reason for these small increases
in liquid use in the policy scenarios is the drop in the domestic price of
oil sub-products that enter as feedstock inputs to production in the pro-
cesses of chemical and petrochemical industries.
In both countries, the transportation sector increases energy use
over time in the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline). As shown in Fig. 15, the
more stringent emission reduction scenarios lead to substantial de-
creases in energy use. Scenario 2e (50% abatement (GHG)) reduces
transportation energy use by 30% for Brazil and 34% for Mexico. These
percentages increase to almost 50% in Scenario 2 g (50% abatement
(FF&I)). For Brazil, the two tax scenarios increase bioenergy production,
while the two cap scenarios decrease it; for Mexico, biofuel production
increases in all scenarios, but remains relatively small given low ﬂex-
fuel ﬂeet in the country.
These results underscore the relevance of the transportation sector
inmitigation, and the need for alternatives to efﬁciently reduce its ener-
gy use (e.g., more ﬂeet ﬂexibility, public transportation or cleaner tech-
nologies such as public and private modes of electric transportation).
Further research in this area is recommended to evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of different transportation modes in Brazil and Mexico
with the goal of reducing GHG emissions—this may aid policy makers
in focusing policy efforts.
4.5. Energy trade
In this section, we brieﬂy provide some context on energy trade in
both countries and explore some alternatives for oil production devel-
opment in Brazil and natural gas imports in Mexico. Both Mexico and
a) Coal b) Refined Oil Products
Fig. 19.Mexico's net imports.
21 Total imports were 1458 mmcfd, exports 83 mmcfd, and a statistical difference of
38 mmcfd.
Fig. 20.Mexico's natural gas production, consumption, and trade.
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sectors, although the two differ in the state of development of their
petroleum industries. Mexico has been exporting oil since the 1970's;
its main oil ﬁelds appear to have reached maturity, and some ﬁelds
show a substantial decay in production. This situation has resulted in a
major energy reform to canalize private investment in order to
revitalize oil production. Brazil is not quite self-sufﬁcient in terms of
oil (BP, 2014b; IEA, 2013), though analysts and policy makers in Brazil
expect future oil exports, following developments in deep water sites
(BP, 2014a; IEA, 2014d, 2013).
Uncertainties surround the future development of the oil industry in
both countries, butwe project that bothwill be able to revitalize their oil
industries if the resources are developed adequately and with needed
investment. To account for potential technological challenges, for
Brazil, we consider two variations of the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline)
with different rates of resource development. As presented in Fig. 16,
our modeling results suggest that Mexico could increase its exports
above 2 million barrels per day (Mbd) from 2020 to 2050, and Brazil
could export between 0.9 and 1.3 Mbd for the same period. In both
cases, our estimates of potential production levels for 2020 are in corre-
spondencewith the estimates by IEA (IEA, 2014d).Without climate pol-
icy, oil exports peak in the 2030's for both countries. If new oil ﬁelds in
Brazil are developed at a slower pace (Core Baseline—slow oil develop-
ment), then oil exports start declining as domestic production is used
tomeet fast-growing domestic oil demand; and by 2040 Brazil becomes
a net importer of oil once again.
Oil exports are reducedwhen climate policy is implemented because
explicit or implicit carbon price makes oil more expensive for con-
sumers, which results in reduced demand for oil. In addition, there is
some economic contraction that leads to a reduction in overall demand
as well. For example, Scenario 2 g (50% abatement (FF&I)) results in re-
duced oil exports of 13% for Mexico and 47% for Brazil (relative to CoreBaseline - fast oil development). Under Scenario 2 g (50% abatement
(FF&I)), oil exports peak in 2030 for Mexico and in 2020 for Brazil.
In addition to oil export dynamics, we ﬁnd that Brazil increases bio-
fuel exports in all scenarios, particularly under the tax scenarios; how-
ever, even in Scenario 2 g (50% abatement (FF&I)) Brazil's biofuel
exports are only about 0.2 EJ, indicating that biofuels are not likely to
play a major role in Brazil's energy exports (Fig. 17). In the Scenario
1a (Core Baseline), both countries are net importers of reﬁned oil prod-
ucts and coal (except for Brazil in 2030, which is affected by our as-
sumption of fast oil development), as shown in Figs. 18 and 19. For all
policy scenarios, Brazil reduces its coal imports. Brazil also increases
its imports of reﬁned oil products, particularly in 2050, when domestic
demand is substantially higher thannational oil production. ForMexico,
coal imports are generally low (below 0.01 EJ in most scenarios), but
they increase in some scenarios as a result of an increased coal use in
the power sector (with CCS technologies).
Natural gas is of strategic importance for Mexico—it is expected to
meet most of the power sector energy demand, and it also plays a
major role for industrial use (see Sections 4.2 and 4.4). Thus, we detail
ourmodeling assumptions for natural gas and provide the reference sta-
tistics regarding natural gas trade in Mexico as a benchmark for our
modeling results. In 2010, domestic demand for natural gas in Mexico
was 6341 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd) and production was
5004 mmcfdm, resulting in net imports21 of 1337 (SENER, 2013). De-
mand and production estimates in EPPA are 10% higher than historical
ﬁgures in 2010, with the same level of imports. The Mexican govern-
ment estimates that, by 2027, Mexico will reach production of
6848 mmcfd (the EPPA estimate for 2025 is 6721). By 2050, EPPA
estimates Mexico's domestic production of natural gas to be
613C. Octaviano et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 600–61412,552 mmcfd, requiring additional imports of 2117 mmcfd to satisfy
demand in that year. In order to keep imports below this level (between
14 and 20% of total demand) domestic production in the country needs
to maintain a fast-paced growth to match demand (Fig. 20). If invest-
ments in domestic natural gas resources and infrastructure are not ad-
equate, Mexico could meet its natural gas demand with imports
rather than domestic production.22
Climate policy inMexico reduces both domestic production and con-
sumption of natural gas. As the policy is implemented globally, natural
gas price in the USA (a major exporter of natural gas to Mexico) is re-
duced, which makes it un-economic to develop more costly resources
both in the USA andMexico. Ourmodeling results show that in Scenario
2 g (50% abatement (FF&I)), Mexico's natural gas imports decrease by
48% from the Scenario 1a (Core Baseline) by 2050.
It is worth mentioning that without investments in oil and gas,
Mexico and Brazil could substantially increase their imports of both re-
sources. Due to the previously discussed technological and institutional
uncertainties, the risks involved in the development of these resources
should be considered when crafting climate policy, along with the po-
tential co-beneﬁts (e.g. reduced fuel imports) and interactions with
other policies addressing energy security matters. Brazil can rely in its
hydropower resources for electricity generation; Mexico, on the other
hand, will have to heavily rely on imports of natural gas if local re-
sources remain difﬁcult to tap. In addition, if energy investment into
oil exploration and exploitation is not timely, or if the results are unsuc-
cessful for technical reasons, oil imports will be necessary to satisfy
growing demand for transportation and industrial uses.
5. Conclusions
We have evaluated climate policy options and their implications for
the two largest Latin American economies: Brazil and Mexico. We ﬁnd
that there are substantial differences between the impacts on economy
and energy systems in these two countries. The dominant low-carbon
technologies are hydropower, wind and biomass for Brazil, and carbon
capture and storage, hydropower and nuclear in Mexico. Meeting sub-
stantial emission reduction targets requires large-scale changes in
their energy systems—in the most stringent policy scenario (a 50% re-
duction of all GHGs by 2050 relative to 2010 levels), both countries
fully decarbonize electricity. The cost of reaching ambitious reduction
targets also differs—from 2020 to 2050, GDP losses range from 4 to
11% for Mexico and 0–4% for Brazil.
GHG emission reduction requires substantial changes in energy, ag-
riculture and land use practices. An analysis that encompasses energy
and other economic sectors—such as the one we present using the
MIT EPPA model—is valuable to investigate the full mitigation potential
of the Latin American countries. For instance, when climate policy
covers only fossil fuel and industrial emissions, costs are 33% higher in
Brazil and 22% higher inMexico compared to a policy design that covers
all economic sectors. This result conﬁrms that economy-wide emission
trading mechanisms could substantially reduce mitigation costs. We
ﬁnd a largemitigation potential could be realized in these two countries
for the period 2010–2050, in the order of 12.4 Gt CO2e cumulative emis-
sions reduction in Brazil and 7.4 Gt CO2e cumulative emissions reduc-
tion in Mexico.
Due to the global nature of GHG impacts, a successful agreement to
limit climate change requires global participation. Mitigation by even
the largest emitters alone would not solve the problem (Paltsev et al.,
2012)—actions are needed from all emitters. Brazil and Mexico have
taken what they consider to be nationally appropriate mitigation
actions—Brazil has already decreased emissions below its Copenhagen22 Currently, Mexico has been experiencing acute infrastructure bottlenecks that have
increased the imports of natural gas. In 2010, about 47% of the imports were identiﬁed
by theMinistry of Energy as “logistic-imports”meaning those requireddue to lack of pipe-
lines and other infrastructure to use local resources (SENER (2013)).pledges, and Mexico has implemented policies that are consistent
with its 30% emissions reduction goal. Going forward, extensive discus-
sions remain regarding their future contributions to mitigation. So far,
international climate negotiations face the challenge of ﬁnding a “fair”
scheme for each individual country's contributions to global GHG emis-
sion reduction. There are numerous proposals for burden sharing (IPCC,
2014) that calculate equal percentages, equalmarginal cost or same car-
bon price among the countries. Studies have shown that a global carbon
tax or cap-and-trade system is an efﬁcient way to reduce emissions;
however, recent approaches (discussed at theUN conferences in Copen-
hagen (UN, 2009) and Cancun (UN, 2010)) focus on national plans that
differ from country to country. The results of our study justify the Co-
penhagen–Cancun approach.
For Brazil and Mexico, we found that because of differences in ener-
gy and land use emissions sources, same carbon prices and emission
caps lead to very different policy costs—speciﬁcally, cumulative costs
in Mexico are about twice as high as those in Brazil. Another difference
is that the largest share of Mexico's GHG emissions comes from energy,
while in Brazil agricultural activities are responsible for the largest
share. Therefore, a policy that targets only energy emissions would
not affect the largest sources of emissions in Brazil. Energy efﬁciency
plays an important role in mitigation scenarios for both countries, and
energy and electricity uses are reduced in all policy scenarios relative
to a no-policy scenario. In all climate policy scenarios, Brazil continues
to rely on hydropower with some additional electricity from wind, bio-
mass and natural gas, particularly in Scenario 2e (50% abatement (GHG))
and Scenario 2g (50% abatement (FF&I)), while Mexico employs CCS
substantially on fossil-based generation. Land-use emissions policies
are important to consider in both countries; especially in Brazil, land-
use policies change the total economic costs of different energy policies,
as discussed by Gurgel and Paltsev (2014). In this study, we assumed
that current policies to control deforestation would be kept in place.
We underscore the importance of these deforestation policies (which
should not be confused with a no-policy world). Without strict control,
high rates of deforestation could occur in Brazil and Mexico, with detri-
mental impacts on climate change and regional ecosystems. Brazil's de-
forestation emissions reduction policy should be maintained; Mexico
should use Brazil's example to reduce its land use emissions.
Our study conﬁrms that climate policies proposed in Copenhagen
and Cancun by Brazil and Mexico are solid steps in the right direction,
and that further mitigation actions should be considered in light of dif-
ferentiated costs across countries, their starting position, and differing
national capacities. Though many challenges lie ahead in the process
of further GHG mitigation in Mexico and Brazil, continuing to develop
strategies tailored to ﬁt each country's energy and land use composition
is a plan that should be maintained. We nevertheless underscore the
need for all national strategies to add up to the UNFCCC goals of climate
stabilization to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
Earth's climate. Our study illustrates the difﬁculties underlining the dis-
cussions of burden sharing with developing countries, given different
economic structures and emissions proﬁles. Even among countries
that share similar levels of development, and that have agreed to start
mitigation action, moving towards deep mitigation implies different
costs and beneﬁts that need to be considered through national lenses.
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